Tyron Goldschmidt has recently published a non-paper in which he claims to demonstrate the causal power of absences. His non-paper is, precisely, an empty page. The non-paper is ingenious and at first 'glance' the 'reader' might think that the absence of words on the page does prove that negative beings can literally cause states such as surprise or disappointment.
good many of them indicates no lack of a sound ontological sensenot so much a taste for desert landscapes, à la Quine, but more a preference for oases over mirages.
To grasp the full force of my response to Goldschmidt, however, each reader must not read his ingenious contribution for himself. Each reader must, in the spirit of Hume, turn their gaze within and inspect their own personal reaction to Goldschmidt's powerful challenge. I do not want to bias the reader with a report of the result of my own inward turn.
You must, I insist, first do the opposite of what St Augustine tells us God commanded him to do. Rather than take Goldschmidt's paper and read it, I command you to take Goldschmidt's paper and not read it.
So, have you not read it? Good. I will first report my unconsidered reaction. Then I will report my considered reaction and you will, I trust, see that these are your reactions too, once you impress some sound reasoning upon Goldschmidt's tabula rasa. In temporal order, I initially reacted thus. (1) How annoying, I've only downloaded the cover sheet of the paper. I must download it again. (2) How incredibly annoying, I've still only downloaded the cover sheet! (3) No, I haven't done anything wrong; my computer is not playing up; my internet connection is fine. So the publisher has made a mistake and not posted Goldschmidt's entire paper. (4) But at the top of the page the paper is reported as being only one page long! (5) Oh, I get it. But wait! Goldschmidt has done it! By Heaven, the lack of text has reallyreally -surprised me. I've been metaphysically smacked in the face by, of all things, an absence! Needless to say, Goldschmidt achieved, at least with me, his intended effect in a way that no philosophy paper I have ever not read has ever doneat least so quickly. A psychological effect does not, however, a piece of philosophical reasoning make. We philosophers are not lacking in vulnerability to intellectual sleights of hand. Fortunately, having been thinking about this topic for quite a while, and not allowing myself to mistake (1)-(5) above as containing any kind of rational persuasion, I feel on solid ground in objecting that Goldschmidt has not in the least made out his case for absence causation.
Why not? Well, it is hard to deny that I was struck by something. I was really caused to be surprised. So what surprised me? Was it the negative being constituted by an absence of text on the page (apart from the title, author, and a few sundries)? Note that there was much that was absent from the pagenot only text but also splotches of ink, pictures of daffodils, the names of other philosophers, et cetera and probably ad infinitum. After all, if, as Goldschmidt believes, absences have causal power, then they must be both real and capable of individuation, so he cannot deny that all these other absences existthose, to be precise, that are absences from his non-paper. So I should have been surprised by all these other absences as well, shouldn't I?
Not at all, comes the reply: for you were not expecting there to be pictures of daffodils or splotches of ink. True, but what was I expecting? Suppose Goldschmidt's nonpaper had contained only the text of the first page of War and Peace. Then it would still have been a non-paper, only in a different way. I would still have been surprised, but for a different reason. In the first case I expected some text; there wasn't any; and I was surprised.
In the second case I also expected text, and I got it; no surprise there. But I also expected philosophical text, not a page of Tolstoy; and so I was surprised by that. By whatby the lack of philosophical text? Well, Goldschmidt's actual non-paper also lacks philosophical text, and the absence of text is not identical to the absence of philosophical text. So why was I not surprised by the lack of philosophical text in his actual non-paper? Why no causal 'oomph' (or 'biff' 4 ) both from the lack of text and from the distinct lack of philosophical text? Will Goldschmidt say that I did not expect philosophical text, only text? How wrong he would be, for I can only avow that I did expect both from his actual non-paper. So why didn't they both surprise me? Again, I can only report that what surprised me was the lack of any text. To be sure, had there been a page of Tolstoy I then would have been surprised by the lack of philosophical text, but Goldschmidt's actual non-paper is not like that. I suspect that if he had published a page of Tolstoy, under the same title as his actual non-paper, the surprise generated would have been different.
This instance of the 'problem of profligate causation', as it is called, 5 is a hard nut to crack. Goldschmidt might insist that the absence of text from his non-paper, and the absence of philosophical text, are one and the same absence in this world. True, you can have one without the other in some possible world, but in the actual world, as far as his actual nonpaper is concerned, they are identical. I find this move dubious: after all, the non-paper also lacked legible text, and I expected legible text, but was decidedly not surprised by its absence. So what is the single, causally operative absence Goldschmidt could have in mind if he made such a movethe lack of black, legible, justified, first-line indented, evenly spaced prose? (Just go through that journal's style guidelines: to be frank, I expected a decent amount of these to characterise the text I expected.) I'm having trouble identifying the absence itself, let alone knowing whether it literally struck my mind, thereby generating surprise.
Yet suppose we have pinned down the absence. Since not all of its components struck me (such as the lack of legibilityalthough I expected it, I tell you!)in fact only one component did, namely the lack of textin virtue of what is it the case that this component did surprise me and the others did not? What move could Goldschmidt make now? Perhaps rank the expectations in order of strength? He might say that I was only surprised by whatever I expected most of all, which was just text. This looks gratuitous. Assuming we could even rank the levels of strength of my relevant expectations (what a task...), why shouldn't I have been struck by the lack of the two features I expected the most, say both text and philosophical text, or the top three (add, say, paragraph spacing or some such)... What remotely plausible principle could be at work here?
Now Goldschmidt might change tack. I am mistaken, he might argue, in thinking that it is causal 'oomph' he is pointing to. No, he might insist, it is another theory of absence causation he is defending, such as a Lewisian counterfactual theory (with, let us not forget, all of its attendant problems). 6 To say that I am caused to be surprised by the lack of text is not to say that there is a causal relation at work, only that if there had been text I would not have been surprised, and so on. We all know the drill. No, I reply: Professor Goldschmidt, you could not get away with that. Is it not causal power you are seeking to defend? The clue is in the title of your non-paper! You think absences can be causally operative, 7 not merely causally relevant 8 or causally explanatory. 9 We can all agree that absences, whatever they are, have a causally relevant, explanatory role: you did not have to go to the inordinate effort of not writing your non-paper to convince anyone of that.
The metaphysical problems are piling up. To add a cherry to the cake, consider now my reaction rather than the alleged absence I reacted to. I was, I admit, quite surprised. I expected there to be text. But note: I also wanted there to be text, yet I did not feel that my desire had been frustrated. I hoped for text, but I did not feel my hopes had been dashed. I looked forward to text, but its absence did not make me feel deprived of an intellectually enjoyable hour or two reading Professor Goldschmidt's limpid prose. Here is what went on in my head: I saw a sheet of paper (actually a pdf page, but let's talk the old-fashioned way) with a title, author's name, and some sundries. What impinged on my sense organs, causing a certain sensory experience, was a predominantly white page with a small amount of information on it. The only 'oomph' there could have been came from that. It is of no avail to objectwhich is not true anyway, 10 but suppose it werethat all seeing is seeing as or seeing that, that one could question whether I even saw a page, or saw any text at all as opposed to a patch of white and some smaller black shapes overlapping the white. The question is whether the absence of relevant textthe expected philosophical text -could have any 'oomph' of its own, whether or not the other things I am certain I saw also have 'oomph'. As long as something has 'oomph', even if it be just pixels or ink marks, we have the required contrast with absences.
Once the page and the small amount of text on it had caused my sensory experience, I was surprisednot by something else I saw, but once I had realised that there was nothing else on the page, that the page lacked what I expected to see as well. My question to myself was along the lines of, 'What am I looking at here? The page is blank save for an author and title!' I knew already what I was seeing, but I hadn't yet worked out why I was startled. 'Oh, I see', my internal monologue continued -'I am surprised because there is no other text'. My 'I see' was not a realisation that I was seeing an additional being, to wit an absence of text.
Were I to have seen that, I would have seen it at the same time as I saw the page, author and title, with no delay for confusion and head scratching. After all, if the absence were real and had 'oomph', there is no reason why its 'oomph' should have been any less powerful, any slower acting, than the 'oomph' exercised by the white page with its small amount of text.
But I did delay. I pondered. I thought I had made a mistake. Then I thought the publisher had made a mistake. Then I came to an understanding, in other words, I grasped a truth I had not grasped beforethat the author was intentionally surprising me in a performative way, by the very 'paper' itself, and this in virtue of the truth that the 'paper' lacked philosophical text and was supposed to lack it. I defy any reader who has taken a look at Goldschmidt's non-paper before reading this one to avow with all sincerity that they did not go through the same, or a very similar, ratiocinative process before realising what was going on. Now we often ratiocinate, of course, about what it is we are perceiving. We have to interpret the world around us, whether consciously or via unconscious, hard-wired mechanisms. Of itself the need for ratiocination proves nothing. I ask the reader, though, to attend to the particular train of thought that accompanied their inspection of Goldschmidt's purported demonstration. Did you just see an absence? No, I insistyou did not. You never took yourself to be doing such a thing. You saw a page and you saw a bit of text, but you had to work out what that meant as far as absences themselves are concerned. After all, the title of the paper, which you did see, directed you to just such reflection. Ask yourself: if you saw an absence, why did it take you so long to realise that you saw it? Did you have to train yourself to see it? How did that work, and why was it even necessary? Or did you, as I contend, come to the realisation, after some ratiocination, that there was no text where it should have been?
The metaphysical moral we should draw from all this is that we have here no demonstration of the causal power of absences. We can account for what we need to account for in other, metaphysically palatable ways. We do not need to reduce putative absence causation to explanation, or causal relevance, or counterfactual dependence. All of these do come into play, but we can also keep well away from the Quinean desert landscape. In fact, on the sort of theory I defend, our landscape needs to be far more lush, far more exotic, and also far more inviting than anywhere Quine would have felt at home. For we need to recognise the existence of potentialities, states of need, normative realities, privations, and the full machinery of a neo-Aristotelian theory of being. With that machinery put to work, we can find positive truthmakers for negative truths without having to postulate real absences with causal powers. We can also account for truths of absence causation by grounding them in real causal processes, in actualities with causal powers and attendant potencies. Absences are not real beings, on this theory, but they are 'beings of reason' as the Scholastics put itwhat we grasp insofar as we grasp truths in which absences play an ineliminable role. 11 Why all the presumptuous psychologising, you may ask? Well, isn't Goldschmidt's non-paper just one big exercise in psychology? Isn't he asking us to turn the gaze within and see what he claims he sees? So I turn my gaze within and I do not see nothing as he would have it; but I do see nothing of the sort.
